Constitutional Law - Eminent Domain - Value to Owner as Basis for Compensation by Johnson, Orall B
North Dakota Law Review 
Volume 32 Number 1 Article 9 
1956 
Constitutional Law - Eminent Domain - Value to Owner as Basis 
for Compensation 
Orall B. Johnson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Johnson, Orall B. (1956) "Constitutional Law - Eminent Domain - Value to Owner as Basis for 
Compensation," North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 32 : No. 1 , Article 9. 
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol32/iss1/9 
This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. 
For more information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu. 
RECENT CASES
this. with §152(11) of the Railway Labor Act which would permit agree-
ments compelling workers to join a union as a condition of continued em-
ployment.
It would seem that employers, who may not legally discriminate against
union members, should also be prohibited from discriminating against non-
union workers. The "right to organize" becomes in effect compulsion to
organize under a union shop agreement. A right ceases to be a right, where
it must be exercised in any event.
Perhaps the most powerful denouncement of the closed shop was made in
a dissent by Mr. Justice Frankfurter who cited with approval a great exponent
or organized labor, Mr. Justice Brandeis as saying, "But the American people
should not, and will not accept unionism if it involves the closed shop. They will




CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - EMINENT DOMAIN - VALUE TO OWNER AS BASIS
FOR COMPENSATION - Plaintiff, the owner of a leasehold interest in property
sought to be condemned by defendant, city housing authority, instituted pro-
ceedings to recover the market value of such interest. The defendant appealed
from the trial court's charge to the jury that the Georgia constitutiont did
not require the use of the fair market value of the leasehold interest as the
basis for determining just compensation; that the just and adequate compen-
sation to which an owner is entitled is the value of property to him, not to
a condemner, and that the measure of damages is not necessarily the market
value of property, but may be the fair and reasonable value thereof. On
appeal it was held, two justices dissenting, that the charge correctly stated
the law as to the proper measure of compensation. Housing Authority Of
Savannah v. Savannah Iron & Wire Works, 87 S.E.2d 671 (Ga. 1955).
It is universally held that property shall not be taken for a public purpose
without the payment of "just compensation." 2 The Fifth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution expressly imposes this limitation on the power of Con-
gress, and the Fourteenth Amendment has been interpreted by the Supreme
Court to impose a similar limitation on the power of all the states.3 Most of
the states have a "just compensation" clause in their own constitutions. 4
"Just compensation" means "the full and perfect equivalent in money of the
property taken" and that "the owner is to be put in as good a position
pecuniarily as he would have occupied if his property had not been taken".6
26. AFL v. American Sash and Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 551 (1949) (dissent).
1. Ga. Const. Art 1 § 3 par. 1. "Private property can not be taken or damaged lor
public purposes without just and adequate compensation being first paid."
2. United States v. Wheeler Township, 66 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1933); Campbell v.
Chase National Bank of New York, 5 F.Supp. 156, 171 (S.D.N.Y. U933) (dictum).
3. McCoy v. Union Elevator Railroad Company, 247 U.S. 354 (1918); Chicago,
Burlington, and Quincy Railroad Company v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
4. The interpretation of the constitutional provision in the instant case may well
find reception throughout the country since a similar clause is contained in the constitution
of all but tvo states, North Carolina and New Hampshire.See Staton v. Norfolk, 111 N.C.
278, .16 S.E. 181 (1892) where the court read this requirement into the North Carolina
Constitution by implication under the due process clause.
5. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943).
6. Ibid.
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There seems to be uniform agreement that "market value," with or without
some verbal qualification, is the proper measure of just compensation, at least
in the usual run of cases.7 "Fair market value" is frequently used, although
there is no reason to suppose that the courts are consciously adopting :a
different standard when they make the addition of "fair" to "market value".,
Occasionally some other variant, like "cash market value," is employed, 9 but
it is doubtful whether there is any real difference between this last variant
and the usual statement, since the courts often imply that the "market value"
must be measured by such a price as might have been obtained by a sale for
cash, rather than for any other consideration.10 Regardless of the verbal
qualification used, most courts have stated that market value or fair market
value is the invariable basis of valuation in eminent domain where no con-
sequential damages to property not taken are involved.- Fair market value
has been described by most courts as being that price which can be obtained
under fair conditions between a willing buyer and a willing seller, when
neither is acting under necessity, compulsion, or peculiar and special circum-
stances."-
While market value is the general yardstick in a condemnation proceeding,
or a suit for compensation in the nature of a condemnation proceeding, there
may be circumstances irl which market value and actual value are not the
same. In these cases the courts attempt to determine the actual value of the
land or interest even though reluctant to adopt a standard other than fair
market value 13
Departure from the general rule as to measure of damages is based upon the
theory that when property is taken, its value to the owner is the only strictly
relevant value, and that market value is acceptable only to the extent that it
may be taken as a rough practical measure of value to the owner. 14 Courts
departing from the general rule of market value indicate that there are in-
stances when one might not be justly compensated for the taking of his
property unless he was awarded an amount adequate to cover the replace-
ment cost of the particular property takken, and conclude that a constitutional
provision providing adequate and just compensation for private property
7. United States v. Commodities Trading Corporation, 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950)
(dictum); United States v. Toronto Navigation Co., 338 U.S. 396, 402 (1949) (dictum);
United States v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 275 (1943) (dictum); Reed v. Ohio Ry. Com-
pany, 126 Ill. 48, 53, 17 N.E. 807, 810 (1888) (dictum); In re Jeffries Homes Housing
Project, 306 Mich. 638, 11 N.W.2d 272, 276 (1943) (dictum).
8. United States v. Commodities Trading Corporation, supra note 7.
9. Fort Worth & D.N. Ry. Company v. Sugg, 83 Tex. Civ. App. 776, 68 S.W.2d 570
(1934); Hetland v. Bilstad 140 Iowa 411, 118 N.W. 422 (1908).
10. Stata Highway Board v. Warthen,' 54 Ga.* App. 759, 189 S.E. 76 (1936);
Conness v. Indiana I. & I. Railroad Company, 193 Il. 464, 62 N.E. 221 (1901).
11. United States v. Certain lands, 47 F.Supp. 934, 937 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (dictum);
People v. Recciardi, 23 Cal.2d 390, 144 P.2d 799, 805 (1943) (dictum); Esch v. Chicago,
M. & St. P. Ry. Company, 72 Wis. 229, 231, 39 N.W. 129, 131 (1888) (dictum).
12. Andrews v. Cox, 127 Conn. 455, 17 A.2d 507 (1941); Maher v. Commonwealth,
291 Mass. 343, 197 N.E. 78 (1935); Louisville & N.R. Company v. Cornelius,
232 Ky. 282, 22 S.W.2d 1033 (1929).
13. See United States v. Dixie Cement Corporation, 178 F.2d 195 (19i9) (Where
condemned land contained sand bank near to and used by a cement plant, the court
permitted instruction that proximity of sand to cement plant resulted in a peculiar value to
owner beyond general market value); Old South Association v. Boston, 212 Mass. 299,
99 N.E. 235 (1912) (Land condemned was tax exempt so long as in hands of petitioner,
and court permitted recovery of a substantial sum in addition to market value because of
the peculiar value to him.); Housing Authority of City of Augusta v. Holloway, 63 Ga.
App. 485, 11 S.E.2d 418 (1940) (dissenting opinion).
14. United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Company, 229 U.S. 53 (1913).
RECENT CASES
taken for public use does not restrict the owner of the property to a :..'ecovery
of the market value.1s
In the instant case it will be observed that the court by applying the
"value to owner" or "value for use to which the property is being devoted"
rule, has departed from the standard employed by most jurisdictions.1' Even
so, irrespective of the measure of damages employed, the judiciary's primary
concern is that the owner of condemned property be awarded its actual value.
Consequently, while "market value" must be retained as the verbal rule of
compensation in order to preclude the possibility of awards based solely upon
sentiment and whim,17 it is emminently just that courts in order to insure full
compensation encourage the admission of evidence tending to show "special"
value in appropriate cases.
ORALL B. JOHNSON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT - EFFECT OF RACIALLY
RESTICTIVE DETERMINABLE FEE - A parcel of land was conveyed to plain-
tiff, a city park commission, upon the limitation, inter alia, that it be used as
a park only by persons of the white race. In a declaratory judgment action
brought by the commission for determination of the validity of the limitation.
the court held that the limitation was valid. If Negros used the park, the
determiable fee conveyed to the park commission would cease and terminate
by its own limitation, and the estate would automatically revert to 'the
grantor. The reversion would not operate by judicial enforcement and rights
of Negros under the Fourteenth Amendment and federal civil rights laws
would not be violated. Charlotte Park and Recreation Commission v. Bar-
ringer, 88 S.E.2d 114 (N. C. 1955).
The court reasoned that because of the automatic reversion there was no
state action within the rule of Shelley v. Kraemer., It therefore concluded
that the discriminatory nature of the limitation would fall outside the ban of
the Fourteenth Amendment and the federal civil rights laws on the theory
that an individual is free to discriminate as long as his acts are unsupported
by state action.
2
The North Carolina Court's employment of the concept of automatic re-
version to avoid the rule of Shelley v. Kraemer raises a greater problem than
it solves. If the happening of the limitation occurs, the title is in the grantor
and the possession in the grantee.3 If the grantor wishes to retake possession,
an action of ejectment is appropriate.4 But if the grantor brings ejectment, a
15. Boom Company v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403 (1917).
16. The instant case was tried only on whether the constitutional provision justified the
charge to the jury as to the value to be placed on property condemned through eminent
domain and not as to whether the fact situation justified the charge. The case would
have been of much greater value had it also passed upon this point.
17. Housing Authority of City of Augusta v. Holloway, 63 Ga.App. 485, 11 S.E.2d 418
(1940) (dissenting opinion) (Court stated that if instructions were not based on market
value the door would be opened to the wildest kind of speculation based upon the fancy
and whim of juries).
1. 334 U.S. 1 (1948) Racial descriminations, such as the determinable fee in the
instant case, are merely wrongful acts of individuals and can remain outside the ban
of the Constitution only so long as they are unsupported by state authority.
2. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); See Hale, Force and State, 35 Col.L.Rev.
149, 181 (1935).
3. Tiffany, Real Property, §217 (3d ed.) (1939).
4. Toth v. Bigelow, I N.J. 379, 64 A.2d 108 (1949).
